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 In 1981 Alasdair MacIntyre published his famous work After Virtue.58 This work 
opens with an invitation to imagine a catastrophe suffered by the natural sciences, a 
catastrophe in which laboratories are destroyed, physicists are lynched, libraries are 
burned, and the teaching of science is abolished. Some generations later, certain 
individuals attempt to revive science, but they have largely forgotten it. They recover the 
vocabulary of the sciences from the manuscripts they discover, and they use these 
rediscovered terms in reinstituted practices bearing the names 'physics,' 'chemistry,' 
'biology,' and so on. But these persons do not fully understand the original meaning of the 
scientific terms they have rediscovered. They have only a "very partial knowledge" of the 
original meaning of each term. The underlying conceptual system in which these terms 
had their original context is entirely lost to this later generation. That however, is not the 
strangest aspect of the picture MacIntyre paints. What is disconcerting about this 
imaginary scenario is that these persons think that they are doing what scientists prior to 
the catastrophe did. They are oblivious to what they do not know. They are like children 
who are playing hospital, but, whereas children know that they are only playing hospital, 
these persons believe that their play is the real thing. 
 What is MacIntyre's purpose in laying out this imaginary world? He explains: 
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which  
we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder  
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as the language of natural science in the imaginary world which I  
described.59 
The problem that MacIntyre describes is not limited to that subcategory within 
philosophy called ethics. How could it be? Ethics is intimately related to our 
philosophical conceptions of human nature, teleology, epistemology and metaphysics. 
Hence the problem that MacIntyre points to in After Virtue is a disorder within 
contemporary philosophical practice, especially as it is ordinarily conceived and 
practiced in the university. 
 Today we find widespread and even severe disagreement among philosophers 
concerning the answers to most philosophical questions. Regarding this, MacIntyre 
writes, 
"On most of the major issues that contemporary academic philosophers 
address – and it makes little difference whether their philosophical 
teachers were Wittgenstein, Quine, and Davidson or Husserl, Heidegger, 
and Derrida – there are currently two or more rival and competing views, 
giving expression to disagreements that run deep. There appears in almost 
all such cases to be no signs of any future resolution of such 
disagreements. Each contending party advances its own arguments, 
presents its own understanding of the relevant concepts, and responds to 
criticisms and objections in ways that satisfy its standards, but without 
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providing those who disagree with anything like what they would take to 
be a sufficient reason for withdrawing from their own position."60 
In many if not most cases the disagreements appear chronically irresolvable, without 
even an imaginable path toward resolution. These disagreements among philosophers 
have also contributed to the general disregard for the discipline of philosophy as a truth-
discovering practice, both by those in other areas of academia and in the general public. 
This has also led to the marginalization of philosophy as an integrating science in the 
university and in society, and its de facto replacement by physics, biochemistry, 
neurophysiology, psychology and other similar sciences.61 The chronic and irresolvable 
character of these disagreements has contributed over time to a shift in the conception of 
philosophy, even the self-conception of philosophy by philosophers, from a truth-
discovering practice to an activity or set of activities unified by a much less clearly 
defined nature and end.  
 Concerning the difference between philosophy as a truth-discovering practice, and 
the contemporary conception of philosophy, Hilaire Belloc writes: 
"We have used in this connection the word "discovery," in connection 
with philosophy. It needs a line of explanation; for the modern world has 
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  In his 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio, Pope John Paul II referred to this marginalization of 
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come to use the term "philosophy" to mean something very different from 
its true meaning. Philosophy signifies primarily the love of knowledge – 
ultimate knowledge upon the ultimate realities; and, by extension, it 
especially signifies the solving of questions which the mind puts to itself 
relative to the most important subjects with which the mind can deal. Thus 
this word "discovery" is especially applicable to the philosophic function – 
the action of the mind when it succeeds in philosophical research. … It is 
the discovery of a new piece of reality; the establishment of a new 
certitude in the place of guesswork. … Now because many of these 
questions have seemed at first sight insoluble, there has arisen, from the 
beginnings of the philosophic discussion, a sort of imitation of philosophy 
which the later Greeks called "sophistry," and of which it is a fair 
definition to say that it is the art of making up systems which do not really 
solve problems and which are hardly intended to do so by their authors; 
which are, in a word, not discoveries, but merely guesses at the best, or at 
the worst a mass of verbiage. This kind of stuff, which antiquity early 
learned to separate from true philosophy (which is the search for reality 
and the definition of it when discovered) has flourished prodigiously … 
from the end of the 18th Century to the latter part of the 19th; and to it 
most modern educated men … still give the term philosophy today."62  
In this respect, we might revise MacIntyre's imaginary scenario, and ask ourselves the 
following question: If the practice of philosophy had at some point in recent history been  
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replaced by sophistry, how would we know? What would be different? But I do not 
intend to answer that question here. Instead I want to focus on why philosophy cannot 
simply rest with widespread internal disagreements, and address the problem that 
underlies these seemingly irresolvable disagreements. In this paper I draw from 
MacIntyre's account of the plain person, and from a consideration of the implications of 
the catholicity of philosophy to present a means by which to overcome the seeming 
incommensurability of chronically irresolvable philosophical disagreements. 
The Catholicity of Philosophy 
 Philosophy as a social practice distinct from sophistry not only seeks truth; it 
seeks agreement concerning the truth. The pursuit of agreement is itself part of the 
philosophical pursuit of truth. Of course charity bids us share what we have discovered. 
But the pursuit of agreement is intrinsic to the practice of philosophy. That is partly  
because our pursuit of philosophical truth is a social pursuit, not merely an individual 
pursuit. But the essential social dimension of the practice of philosophy is itself rooted in 
the very nature of what it is that the practice of philosophy pursues. Philosophy as a 
practice pursues the truths about the reality we share with each other, that is, the world in 
which we all live. The very nature of philosophy is to seek out truths about the big 
questions, not so much questions about particular times, particular places, particular 
causes, particular beings or particular persons, but truths about the nature and origin and 




"What is philosophical knowledge knowledge of? It is knowledge of 
Truth, the truth concerning "all that exists" and the complex relationships 
between the myriad of particular facts that comprise the universe."63 
"Human beings in every culture pose fundamental existential questions 
about the order of things, about their own nature, and about their place in 
the order of things. Every religion advances its own answers to those 
questions, such questions as "Who am I? Where have I come from and 
where am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this life?"64 
The universality of these questions entails that philosophy cannot rest in the merely 
provincial, the ephemeral or the merely individual or subjective. The very nature of 
philosophical questions entails that philosophy as a practice must ever seek to be 
universal. We can refer to this universality as the catholicity intrinsic to the practice of 
philosophy. The philosopher as such seeks answers to questions that are not limited only 
to him or to her, in his or her time or place or culture, but are the universal and perennial 
questions asked by human persons of all times, places, languages and cultures. That is 
why catholicity is intrinsic to philosophy; anything lacking catholicity is something less 
than philosophy, at least in philosophy's fullest and most mature expression.  
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  Ibid, p. 165. In the last part of this excerpt, MacIntyre is quoting from the opening paragraph 
of Fides et Ratio, which reads: " Moreover, a cursory glance at ancient history shows clearly how 
in different parts of the world, with their different cultures, there arise at the same time the 
fundamental questions which pervade human life: Who am I? Where have I come from and where 
am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this life? These are the questions which we 
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 This does not imply that we must begin our philosophical pursuit by first 
divesting ourselves of all our particularity or historical rootedness. On the contrary, 
argues MacIntyre, what we in all our particularity, our time, our place, our culture, our 
religion, our memories, our tradition, our concrete historical perspective, bring to the 
pursuit of philosophical truths is essential to the very success of that pursuit, because the 
particularity we bring with us to this inquiry is that through which and in which we find 
the universal answers to our philosophical questions. 
 Precisely because of philosophy's intrinsic catholicity, philosophers by the very 
nature of their practice seek agreement with other philosophers concerning the truths of 
philosophy. To refuse to seek agreement with other philosophers, or to rest content with 
seemingly irresolvable disagreements would be to deny the catholicity of philosophy. It 
would do so either by begging off philosophical questions altogether, or by 
performatively denying that there are any true answers to philosophical questions, or at 
least that those true answers are discoverable by us.  
 Hence philosophers as such cannot rest content with the present state of discord 
and disagreement within philosophy, but must pursue agreement. Yet merely plucking up 
our intellectual courage is not enough to overcome the chronic disagreement. We need to 
consider the underlying reasons for our internal disagreements, the fundamental points of 
disagreement explaining why the present disagreements seem irresolvable. This is one of 
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the tasks MacIntyre has taken up over the last thirty years. This is what has brought him 
to write about first principles and plain persons.65 
The Plain Person as the Material Ground for the Catholicity of Philosophy 
 The catholicity of philosophy entails that its true answers be the answers to every 
human person's deepest questions about reality. But to reach such answers we must 
reason in a universal or catholic way. That is, the reasoning by which philosophy reaches 
these answers must be accessible, in principle, to every human person, and thus must 
begin with premises that are shared either explicitly or implicitly. Without shared 
premises, our arguments would beg the question from the point of view of those who do 
not share our premises. Hence we must find common ground, a universal common 
ground from which to reach conclusions accessible in principle to every human person. 
 Where do we find this common ground? We find it in what MacIntyre refers to as 
the plain person. He has referred to the plain person in multiple places, but here consider 
one example. In discussing the 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio, MacIntyre writes: 
"The questions that philosophers ask are, the encyclical declares, questions 
that they first ask, not qua philosopher, but qua human being, qua plain 
person. They are the same questions as those asked by other plain persons 
and every plain person is potentially a philosopher. By asking those 
questions rigorously and systematically philosophers therefore, we may 
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infer, are to practice their trade, their craft, on behalf of all plain persons. 
They contribute to the common good by so doing, just as other plain 
persons, say carpenters or farmers, do. So philosophers owe it to other 
members of their community to speak and write in such a way that, so far 
as possible, what they say is accessible to those who are not academic 
philosophers. The philosopher shares with the plain non-philosophical or 
pre-philosophical person the need for and the search for truth: for the 
truths of everyday life, for the truths to be discovered by scientific 
research, for the truth about human goods and about the final human 
good."66 
MacIntyre points out that the philosopher pursues the answers to philosophical questions 
not first as philosopher, but first as human being. The initial starting point of every 
philosophical inquiry is the common sense of the plain person, which MacIntyre also 
describes here as the pre-philosophical person. Catholicity could not be intrinsic to 
philosophy unless there were a shared common ground from which we reason. This 
shared common ground is also the shared resource by which seemingly irresolvable 
philosophical disagreements may in principle be resolved. The shared common ground is 
not only a shared capacity for reasoning, but also a shared body of knowledge acquired in 
the pre-philosophical period of every human life. 
 Regarding this relation of pre-philosophical knowledge to philosophy, Vincent 
McNabb writes, 
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"We shall therefore define philosophy as organised and supreme common 
sense. By common sense we mean two things.; both [understood by] the 
people. First we mean "good sense," i.e. the plain view and certitude of the 
plain man-in-the-street. If any of the readers of this book do not know 
what this "good sense" is, they are plainly disqualified from reading 
further into its pages. Indeed they seem to qualify instead of psychological 
or medical treatment. Secondly, by common sense we also mean "common 
consent." Thank heavens, the majority of mankind (i.e. "the poor," as 
Lacordaire used to say) who have daily less and less material goods, still 
hold the bulk of the world's sound good sense. … When we have defined 
philosophy as organised, supreme common sense, we have not discredited 
but have further accredited common sense. If the few who think, or who 
think they think, find themselves in opposition to the man on plain matters 
of fact, it is not the many, but the few who must mend their thinking. 
Philosophy's first duty is to justify mankind's intuitions. In other words, 
the philosopher is not the advocate of the devil, but the guardian of the 
poor."67 
This conception of the relation between the knowledge had by the plain person, and 
philosophy, is not widely held today. But it is very much in keeping with MacIntyre's 
understanding of the philosopher's relation to, even duty to, the plain person.  
 One objection to the claim that the common human experience of the plain person 
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is that common ground by which seemingly irresolvable philosophical disputes may be 
resolved, is that if there were such a common body of knowledge, the chronic and 
seemingly irresolvable philosophical disputes that have characterized the contemporary 
practice of philosophy would have been resolved. In short, the objection is that such a 
hypothesis oversimplifies, and is too facile. According to MacIntyre, the objection itself 
oversimplifies the situation, because it overlooks the possible ways in which persons can 
diverge from the body of knowledge possessed by the plain person, as I shall now 
explain. 
The Plain Person and Resolution of the Unresolvable 
 We know that to avoid begging the question, the premises of our arguments must 
at least be plausible to our interlocutors. That is because in order to reason together, we 
need to have common ground from which to reason. Rational mutual comparison of 
differing philosophical claims requires shared recognition of standards by which these 
claims and positions are weighed against each other. The presence of seemingly 
irresolvable disagreements among contemporary philosophers calls into question both the 
catholicity of philosophy and the availability of common ground by which to resolve 
these disagreements. Let's consider the various contexts in which philosophical 
disagreements occur. 
 In his book Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre lays out four 
different theoretical contexts in which justification of an ethical or philosophical claim 
can be made. The first is that of the "genuinely uninstructed plain person." The second is 
that of the person who understands and shares a virtue-theoretical philosophical scheme 
60 
 
that provides an explanatory framework for the ethical principles already operative within 
the moral practice of plain persons.68 The third type of context for philosophical 
justification, according to MacIntyre, is characterized by a "large degree of 
incommensurability." Debate at this third level can take place only by comparing 
comprehensive standpoints or paradigms.69 Concerning this third type MacIntyre claims 
that "A mistake of much nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Thomism was to 
suppose that the task of rational justification against their Cartesian, Humean, or Kantian 
adversaries was of the second rather than of this third type."70 In other words, nineteenth 
and twentieth century Thomists mistakenly assumed that Cartesians and Humeans and 
Kantians shared the same broader explanatory framework. This mistake resulted in a 
disconnect, and a seeming irrelevance of the Thomistic arguments. But the Nietzschean 
                                                          
68
 "[Q]uestions of rational justification may arise at four different levels. There is first of all that 
of the genuinely uninstructed plain person, posing the question "What is my good?" in a number 
of particularized ways, whose teacher has to assist him or her in the actualization of those 
potentialities which will carry such persons from their initial bare moral apprehensions to a 
discovery of the place of those apprehensions in a larger scheme. There is secondly the person 
who shares that larger scheme and is already able to articulate it in the Aristotelian terms which 
are its most adequate expression, so that demands for rational justification are framed in terms of 
a shared understanding of natural enquiry and a shared conception of first principles, even if what 
is at issue is on occasion their precise formulation. It was from within this kind of agreement that 
Aquinas conducted his debate with some rival Islamic, Jewish, and Latin Averroist positions. 
Such debate is necessarily very different from that between antagonists each of whom 
systematically rejects to some significant degree the other's first principles and conception of 
rational enquiry." (Three Rival Versions, pp. 145-146) 
69
  Ibid, p. 146. MacIntyre writes: "It is … the claim to provide a standpoint which suffers from 
less incoherence, is more comprehensive and more resourceful, but especially resourceful in one 
particular way. For among those resources, so it is claimed, is an ability not only to identify as 
limitations, defects, and errors of the opposing view what are or ought to be taken to be 
limitations, defects, and errors in the light of the standards of the opposing view itself, but also to 
explain in precise and detailed terms what it is about the opposing view which engenders just 
these particular limitations, defects, and errors and also what it is about that view which must 
deprive it of the resources required for understanding, overcoming and correcting them. And at 
the same time it will be claimed that what is cogent, insightful, and true in that opposing view can 
be incorporated within one's own view, providing on occasion needed corrections of that view." 
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opponents were not even at this third level in relation to the Thomists. MacIntyre claims 
that the Nietzscheans represent a fourth, and most removed level of rational justification 
viz-a-viz Thomism. Of this he writes: 
"Yet against Nietzschean opponents it would not be enough to recognize 
this error. For it may well be the case, and it is in large part to Nietzsche 
himself that we are indebted for our understanding of this, that a 
philosophical or theological position may be so organized, both in its 
intellectual structures and in its institutionalized modes of presentation and 
enquiry that conversation with an opposing position may reveal that its 
adherents are systematically unable to recognize in it even those errors, 
defects, and limitations which ought to be recognized as such in the light 
of their own and its standards. When such a situation is encountered … 
then yet another task of a fourth kind is added to the work of rational 
justification. What has to be supplied is a cogent theoretical explanation of 
ideological blindness[.]"71 
This fourth level differs from the third in the following respect: with the third the 
disagreeing parties can at least compare their overall explanatory systems against each 
other. There is a shared implicit rationality by which they both can evaluate their 
respective paradigms, by means of shared criteria that not only explain the shared data 
but also explain why the other paradigm or theory fails to explain the data sufficiently. 
But at the fourth level, there is no present shared criteria showing the superiority of the 
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one and the inferiority of the other. This is a case of prima facie incommensurability. 
MacIntyre proposes that in such a case, instead of pointing to a shared standard by which 
to compare paradigms, we have to explain why those holding the opposing position are 
blind. 
 How is this to be done? Again, given the catholicity of philosophy, this 
explanation of blindness cannot be question-begging. It must be an account capable of 
being seen and understood by those whom we believe to be blind in some respect. In a 
passing phrase elsewhere discussing Aquinas on natural law, MacIntyre gives us an 
important clue as to how this may be done. He writes: 
"Aquinas … is speaking of a knowledge of the natural law which human 
beings have by nature and that, since we are all human beings after all, we 
can surely all judge equally of what he says, plain persons and 
philosophers or theologians alike. Consider then Aquinas's portrait of the 
plain person in relation to the precepts of the natural law. The plain person 
initially, as plain child, exhibits his or her knowledge of the principium of 
the natural law; which is the principium of practical reasoning, in the same 
way that he or she exhibits his or her knowledge of the principle of non-
contradiction, that is to say, not in any ability to formulate the principle 
explicitly, but by showing a potentiality to do just that, in the way in 
which the truth of the principle is presupposed in a multiplicity of 
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particular practical judgments."72  
MacIntyre refers to the plain person as initially a plain child, at least like a plain child. No 
human person begins philosophical enquiry, or sets off on some particular philosophical 
narrative or constructing some philosophical system, without first having been a plain 
person, and experienced childhood. And the humility requisite for acquiring the wisdom 
of philosophy in the fullness of its catholicity requires of every philosopher that he or she 
become as a little child, as it were, remembering the philosophical journey, and always 
connecting his or her intellectual movement in such a way that what was known with 
certainty to be good and true is retained.  
 This common ground in the plain person, or the plain child, provides the resource 
by which seemingly irresolvable philosophical disagreements can be resolved. Even 
though in the fourth level of rational justification, the disagreeing parties seem prima 
facie to have no common ground, they each retain memory of the process by which they 
themselves moved from the epistemic condition of plain person to their current epistemic 
philosophical position. They retain the memory of what they knew as plain children in a 
pre-philosophical state. So when faced with seemingly irresolvable philosophical 
disagreements, we find here, in principle, by way of memory, a way to move forward by 
first moving backward. The disputing parties can, in principle, engage in recollection, 
finding common ground in their former selves as plain persons, or even plain children. 
From that point they can trace forward their respective paths of philosophical 
development from that previously shared common ground, accessible to them by 
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recollection. By this mutual recollection they can trace forward their respective 
intellectual development until they arrive at the point in the past where their 
philosophical paths diverged regarding substantive philosophical claims. At this point of 
divergence, they can rationally evaluate their respective intellectual trajectory from 
shared common ground. Then, when one position has been shown to be preferable to the 
other, according to standards both parties shared at that time, it becomes clear that one 
party needs to retrace its steps, as it were, to the point where it took a wrong turn, and get 
back on the authentic path of philosophical development.  
 Notice that in this process of resolving the seemingly irresolvable disagreement 
the disagreeing parties are not presently addressing the present disagreement itself. 
Instead, they are presently addressing a diverging of their philosophical positions that 
took place at some point in the past. And they are presently evaluating this past 
divergence, from the shared viewpoint of their former selves as plain persons. In this way 
they can engage in what is analogous to the second or third level of rational justification. 
This mutual recognition and remembrance of our philosophical development from our 
prior plain-person-self to our present philosopher-self is a development we can mutually 
evaluate by recollection. And this provides a means, in principle, by which disagreement 
at the fourth level of rational justification can be resolved. Only by retrieving the 
common ground shared both by plain persons and by philosophers who each began their 
philosophizing as plain persons, can such disagreements be resolved.   
 Implicit in the claim that such disagreements are in principle resolvable in this 
way, is the notion that authentic philosophical development from the pre-philosophical 
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standpoint of the plain person cannot lead to contradictory or incommensurable positions. 
Why should we believe such a notion to be true? The shared starting point of the plain 
person includes a common body of beliefs acquired through common human experience, 
as well as a common conception of rationality. If that is the case, then whatever 
divergences are possible in authentic philosophical development are not ultimately 
contradictory, but in fact are different expressions of an underlying shared philosophy. 
Authentic philosophical development from the starting point of the plain person may lead 
to diversity of expressions of the implicit philosophy possessed by the plain person, but 
not to contradictions or incommensurable positions. To deny this is to deny the 
catholicity of philosophy, by denying that philosophical questions and their answers are 
universal. But the denial of the catholicity of philosophy is not intrinsic to the position of 
the plain person, nor can it be arrived at by authentic philosophical development from the 
starting point of the plain person.73 The plain person, for MacIntyre, makes use of first 
principles that are not the result of arbitrary stipulation but are necessary preconditions 
for the very possibility of rational inquiry and ethical practice.74 Denying the catholicity 
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of philosophy is not a philosophical claim, but a skepticism equivalent to the 
abandonment of philosophy itself. Recovering the relationship of philosophy to its 
organic starting point in the plain person provides the resource to maintain the catholicity 
of philosophy and overcome the seemingly irresolvable disagreements currently 
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